22 No. 76 JUSTICE “strength[en]” Hamas – but the suit does not allege that he once capitulated to Hamas demands in the face of an imminent threat to anyone’s safety; rather, it alleges that he willingly worked with Hamas for years, providing long-term, strategic assistance. Weiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran Our second case alleges that Iran and Syria assisted Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist groups in carrying out the October 7 massacres. Under the Terrorism Exception, U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism, which include Iran and (for now) Syria, lose any foreign sovereign immunity from suit if they provide “material support or resources” for acts of “extrajudicial killing” and “hostage taking,” causing a plaintiff’s injuries.30 Weiser also brings ATA claims against Hamas and other participating terrorist groups, including Hezbollah. Many prior cases have demonstrated Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah, and the federal court in Washington D.C. (which hears most FSIA cases) has recognized these relationships dozens of times.31 The United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, however, “assess[ed] that Iranian leaders did not orchestrate nor had foreknowledge of the [October 7] HAMAS attack against Israel.”32 Israel thought otherwise – a senior Israeli official told CNN that Iran “may not have known about the exact timing of the raids from Gaza, but was certainly ‘aware of the Hamas operation before it happened.’”33 Weiser provides previously undisclosed Hamas documents, obtained by the IDF in Gaza, that appear to confirm Israel’s view. A September 2022 memorandum from Marwan Issa, deputy commander of the Qassam Brigades (killed by Israel in 2024), to Hamas’s senior leaders, Sinwar and al-Hayya, discussed cooperation with Iran, Syria, and Iran’s terror proxies (i.e., Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”) to engage in “joint activities against the Zionist occupation.” The memorandum reads: “if an open confrontation [with Israel] results … what is needed is for the Axis of Resistance to intervene, headed by the Hezb [Hezbollah] and the other factions (Iraq, Yemen, and Syria).” It also reports that Hamas leadership “agree[s] with our Brothers in Iran that financial support of at least 7 million [U.S. dollars] per month will be approved, over the course of the year, in order to mobilize and prepare for these types of confrontations comfortably.” Another memorandum from Issa to Sinwar lists millions of dollars in Iranian payments to Hamas, including several “offbudget” payments to be made directly to Sinwar. Other uncovered memoranda discuss removing a stumbling block between Hamas and Iran: Syria (itself a defendant in the case). Iran and its proxy Hezbollah supported the Assad regime, affiliated with the Alawite offshoot of Shi’a Islam, whereas Hamas supported the Sunni Muslim insurgency led by the al-Qaeda affiliate al-Nusra Front. To ensure Iranian and Hezbollah support, Hamas reoriented itself toward the Assad regime. A letter from the late Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh to key IRGCQF commander Muhammad Said Izadi in June 2022 discussed “ideas that help build this connection” between Hamas and the Assad regime “in a way that optimizes the situation we are all in, as we are all in the same boat.” A September 2022 letter from Haniyeh to Sinwar noted that “the majority of the [Hamas] movement supports the decision” to reconcile with the Assad regime and dismissed Hamas leader Khaled Mashal’s antireconciliation camp: “We understand that [Mashal’s] opposition is based on personal issues and not substantive ones. If the Syrians would open the door for him, he will be running towards them.” Finally, a 2019 memorandum from Sinwar to the Qassam Brigades’ “Human Resources Branch”34 requested that operatives be nominated for scholarships to study 29. Avner Borochov, “The Mediator,” YEDIOTH AHRONOTH (May 23, 2025), available at https://www.ynet.co.il/ economy/article/yokra14376750 30. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(A)(a)(1). 31. Baxter v. Syrian Arab Republic, No. 18-cv-1078-RCL, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127993, at *10 (D.D.C. July 19, 2022) (“Many courts within this District have found” Iran and Syria “responsible for providing material support to Hamas.”); Lee v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 518 F. Supp. 3d 475, 482 (D.D.C. 2021) (“In exchange for Hezbollah's unwavering dedication to Iran and its revolutionary aims, Iran bankrolled, armed and trained Hezbollah.”). 32. “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (Feb. 5, 2024), available at https://www. dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024Unclassified-Report.pdf 33. Zachary Cohen et al., “Initial US intelligence suggests Iran was surprised by the Hamas attack on Israel,” CNN (Oct. 11, 2023), available at https://edition.cnn. com/2023/10/11/politics/us-intelligence-iran-hamas-doubt 34. The fact that Hamas’s operational arm had an “HR” department speaks to the sophistication of its terrorist infrastructure.
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