21 Winter 2026 According to the lawsuit, Masri himself actively collaborated with Hamas. For example, PADICO’s website displays a picture of Masri posing with a Hamas official at the signing of an agreement to rebuild parts of the estate following prior IDF strikes. Also present at the signing was Abdel Fattah Zari’i, then Hamas’s Deputy Minister of Economy. According to the IDF, Zari’i “served as an operative in Hamas’s manufacturing division,” which was responsible for “increas[ing] Hamas’s weapons capabilities”; he also played a “significant role in directing Hamas’s efforts to seize control of humanitarian aid entering the Gaza Strip.”26 He was killed in an Israeli airstrike in 2024. The lawsuit also alleges that Masri and his companies supplied critical electricity to the tunnel network using solar energy systems funded by the World Bank. Hamas’s attack tunnel systems rely on a constant supply of electricity. As Professor Richemond-Barak explained, “[u]nlike the improvised tunnels used in prison escapes, Hamas’s tunnels are intended for prolonged use, weapon manufacturing, and equipment and weapons storage. These types of tunnels cannot fulfill their functions without ventilation, lighting, and sewage.”27 Masri, using his long-cultivated image as an AmericanPalestinian moderate, “visionary investor,” and “green energy” advocate, led a campaign to secure World Bank funding for a massive solar energy project on the estate’s rooftops. Specifically, the defendants approached the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”), a component of the World Bank. According to the IFC, the United States is its “largest shareholder,” contributing funds “with a historic focus on investment climate reform, private sector development, and solar energy”28 – that is, American taxpayers funded Masri’s solar project. The defendants pitched the project as providing green power to the estate’s commercial tenants with any excess energy routed to Gaza’s troubled electrical grid. They secured the funding and built a solar array of more than 21,000 solar cells on the roofs of the estate. However, the lawsuit maintains that the defendants siphoned energy off into the attack tunnels instead of benefiting the neighboring communities that suffered from frequent energy shortages. Hamas also allegedly used the estate as a key staging area for launching the October 7 attacks. Two weeks prior, Hamas organized a protest at the Gazan border in front of the estate. These periodic protests were primarily aimed at drawing media attention, but were also important tactics to test Israeli border defenses and response times. In the early hours of October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorists gathered in a neighborhood near the estate and headed toward the Karni crossing sector adjacent to the estate as part of what Hamas dubbed “Operation 402.” One group of terrorists traveled in pairs on motorcycles. Other groups of engineers, positioned near the north end of the estate, were tasked with breaching the border fence and walled perimeter. Additional contingents composed of platoons from various terrorist organizations followed in trucks and other vehicles. At 6:29 a.m., both kibbutz Nahal Oz and the neighboring IDF base were hit with rocket and mortar shells launched from Gaza. The shelling destroyed several houses and knocked out the kibbutz’s electrical power. A few minutes after 7 a.m., five motorcycles had reached the perimeter of the kibbutz. Over the next several hours, Hamas terrorists infiltrated the kibbutz, killing fourteen civilians, one police officer, and three soldiers, and kidnapping nine civilians before they were repulsed by the IDF. In the assault on the IDF army base, Hamas and other terrorist groups killed 50 IDF soldiers and took ten as hostages, including soldier Itay Chen, whose family members are among the plaintiffs in the case. The IDF soon struck back at the estate. While the IDF would ordinarily avoid attacking an internationally funded site, the estate posed a serious threat to the anticipated ground invasion of Gaza. According to the complaint, the estate’s tunnel network was intentionally situated along important access roads with the aim of ambushing IDF armor and infantry entering Gaza, so special approvals were granted for targeted airstrikes on these installations in the days immediately following October 7. In an interview with Yediot Ahronot, Masri responded to the lawsuit: “At the entrance to Gaza, I pass between Hamas operatives. It could be ‘Wait here’ or ‘Welcome, come right in.’ So, they’re in charge of everything, and what choice do you have? Whether to give Hamas more strength or to abandon our Gazan employees?”29 Masri appears to argue that he had no choice but to 26. Emanuel Fabian, “IDF says it killed Hamas minister in Gaza who worked to expand arms, plunder aid,” TIMES OF ISRAEL (Aug. 5, 2024), available at https://www. timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-it-killedhamas-minister-in-gaza-who-worked-to-expand-armsplunder-aid/ 27. Supra note 4. 28. “IFC and the United States: Partners in Private Sector Development,” WORLD BANK OKR (March 19, 2024), available at https://hdl.handle.net/10986/41215
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