23 Winter 2026 abroad in Iran. The nominees would study subjects including “engineering,” “special forces,” and “naval forces.” The memorandum even noted that these terroristapplicants must have sufficiently good “high school grade point averages.” Thus, Iran was strategically and financially fully invested in Hamas’s 2022 plan for “open confrontation” with Israel. Although the “Axis of Resistance” was meant to join the invasion immediately, Hamas appeared to have jumped the gun, for reasons that remain unclear. The Weiser complaint also provides insight into one of the more vexing mysteries of October 7: how did Israel so profoundly fail to detect and prevent the attack? Weiser shows that Hamas pulled off a “double bluff” by relentlessly threatening violence while quietly indicating that it was shifting its priorities from terrorism to governance. Hamas’s constant saber-rattling with little actual serious violence suggested that the threats were only meant to appease the terrorist organization’s constituents, and Israel’s intelligence services therefore downplayed them. For example, Hamas made repeated public references to an impending confrontation that in retrospect clearly described the October 7 attacks. In September 2021, Sinwar gave the opening remarks at a Hamas conference in Gaza, promising that Hamas is “hard at work and are making great efforts both above and below the ground, out at sea and in the skies...” Hamas openly bragged about its “joint operations rooms” in Gaza and Beirut. Hamas officials publicly met with Hezbollah’s Nasrallah, Iran’s Khamenei, and officials from the other Palestinian terrorist groups. In August 2023, Hamas’s deputy leader told Hezbollah’s television channel: “The all-out war has become an unavoidable issue, and we believe it is necessary; we want it.” He continued: “We do not talk about [the war] in public. We discuss it in closed rooms. We meet with everyone.” These publicized meetings with its allies created “noise,” effectively burying the “signal” of Hamas’s actual, secret meetings. Meanwhile, starting in 2018, Hamas began limiting its serious attacks against Israel, mixing seemingly civilian tactics such as rioting at the security fence line on the Gaza border with low-intensity military tactics. Hamas tried to give the impression that it preferred governance over direct confrontation, and the ruse appeared to work. For example, Brigadier General Amit Sa’ar, then-chief of the Israeli Military Intelligence research division and considered Israel’s top expert on the Palestinian arena, stated in July 2020 that “Hamas has no interest in a confrontation with Israel. It is deterred. What worries it the most is the economic situation in the Gaza Strip.” Thus, “[a]s long as [it] feels there is progress – projects, international money – Hamas will bite [its] lips.… As long as [it] thinks there is a chance and conditions for a settlement, [it] is interested in keeping the peace.” Of course, as highlighted in Shalom v. Masri, those “projects” were actually enhancing Hamas’s attack capabilities. Conclusion The Shalom v. Masri complaint spells out a tragic reality in Gaza: as long as Hamas is in charge, it will eagerly sacrifice the well-being of Palestinian civilians to pursue its apocalyptic war against Israel. We already know that Hamas diverted billions of dollars in foreign aid into its underground fortress and its leaders’ personal bank accounts. The Shalom v. Masri complaint alleges in detail how even purportedly pro-Western corporations and benefactors have worked hand-in-glove with Hamas for decades. Hamas’s eradication is thus not just a necessity for Israel’s security, but the only realistic chance for a Palestinian future free from grotesque and self-defeating violence. The Weiser complaint shows that Iran’s threat to regional stability is not limited to its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Iran has spent billions on terrorism, and sanctions relief provides it with vastly more money to do so. Although Israel’s post-October 7 victories over Iran and Hezbollah were breathtaking, they do not spell the end of Iran’s commitment to embroil the region in war. Western governments must remain vigilant if they want to promote a more stable and prosperous Middle East. In sum, these two cases seek to shed more light on two avenues of support for Hamas. While governments will at times bring other tools to bear on Hamas and its enablers, such as designations, criminal prosecutions, and diplomatic actions, those efforts have never been systematic and their track record over the past 35 years has been disappointing. Hopefully, civil litigation will play at least some small part in supplementing governmental efforts and in deterring support for Hamas.n Michael Radine is a partner at Osen LLC, one of the premier American law firms dedicated entirely to representing victims of terrorism. He has won cases before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and New York’s highest court against major corporate aiders and abettors of terrorism.
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