74 No. 78 JUSTICE primarily contests the second premise: that UNRWA qualifies as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations.47 It argues that the district court erred by relying heavily on General Assembly resolutions and other nonbinding UN materials rather than the text of the CPIUN and the Charter, which in the Government’s view point the other way.48 And because the Executive Branch’s treaty interpretation is entitled to great weight, the Government maintains that the Court should not have displaced the United States’ contrary reading by deferring to the United Nations’ own characterization of UNRWA.49 The plaintiffs press the attack one level deeper, to Siman Tov’s first premise: that the CPIUN extends immunity to subsidiary organs in the first place.50 The Delaware opposition argues that UNRWA enjoys no immunity because the CPIUN and the Charter extend immunity only to the UN qua UN.51 The D.C. opposition identifies a clear error committed by the Siman Tov court that illustrates precisely how narrowly the CPIUN’s extension of immunity was drafted. In the absence of Government support for immunity, the D.C. opposition contends, the Southern District relied on Article IV, section 11 of the CPIUN as the source of law that explicitly confers immunity on subsidiary organs themselves.52 But as the opposition brief points out, “Article IV § 11 does not confer immunity on any entity at all”; rather, “[i]t grants privileges and immunities to ‘Representatives of Members to the principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations,’ not to the organs themselves.”53 As the D.C. plaintiffs argued, the Siman Tov court wrongly reached the opposite result only by excising the grammatical subject – “Representatives of Members” – from the text, thereby converting a clause protecting individuals into an implied grant of entity-level immunity.54 Thus, the opposition brief argued, the Siman Tov court “effectively manufactur[ed] for UNRWA an immunity that no treaty, statute, or Executive designation has ever conferred.”55 That should trouble everyone. If Siman Tov’s holding becomes the prevailing precedent, it will do so only by depending on rewritten treaty text. In practical effect, that enlarges the power of the General Assembly over the United States without authority to do so, allowing the General Assembly to unilaterally create entities that are immune from U.S. legal process – without Congress, without the Executive, and without any treaty language actually saying so.56 Federal courts should recognize Siman Tov for what it is: an erroneous interpretation that expands immunity beyond what the treaty text can bear.57 At bottom, the Government’s interpretation – that UNRWA is not a subsidiary organ of the United Nations – is not foreclosed by any treaty text and is therefore entitled to great weight.58 The Second Circuit and the district courts in Delaware and the District of Columbia should rule accordingly. III. The Stakes: A Power the General Assembly Was Never Given Granting immunity to UN-established entities without applying these tests and standards of U.S. law would exceed the General Assembly’s authority. The Charter did not create the Assembly as a lawmaking institution, even for the United Nations itself. Yet that is exactly what such deference would produce: a power to confer immunity binding upon American courts on whatever entity it creates for its own purposes and chooses to label a “subsidiary organ,” 47. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 1–2, 6–20, Estate of Siman Tov v. UNRWA, No. 25-2837 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 2026) (hereinafter, “U.S. Amicus”). 48. Id. at 2, 14–19. 49. Id. at 2, 19. 50. Sha’arabany Opposition, supra note 40, at 7-9. 51. Lavi Opposition, supra note 45, at 1, 5-10. 52. Supra note 6, at 220–27. 53. Id. at 8. 54. Id. at 8-9. 55. Id. at 9. 56. U.S. Amicus, supra note 47, at 14-19; see also Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 20–21 (2015). 57. Brief of Amici Curiae Former National Security and Foreign Policy Officials in Support of Appellants at 24-29, Estate of Tov v. UNRWA, No. 25-2837 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 2026) (hereinafter, “Former Officials Br.”). 58. Sumitomo Shoji Am., 457 U.S., supra note 34, at 185.
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