73 Fall 2026 Assembly subsidiary organ.37 The same understanding appeared at UNRWA’s creation: the operative Resolution 302 did not cite Article 22 or describe UNRWA as a subsidiary organ, but instead called upon governments to provide it with privileges and immunities – an odd request if such immunity already attached automatically.38 Indeed, UNRWA itself sought immunity from host states, pursuing and securing agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel explicitly to such ends, but never with the United States. UNRWA responded that, notwithstanding its limited purpose under the Charter, the General Assembly has nonetheless created operational entities whose immunity U.S. courts and prior administrations have recognized. The Government anticipated this position by drawing a line: subsidiary-organ status entitled to immunity extends only to entities performing the Assembly’s authorized Charter functions, not to operational bodies the Assembly has created beyond them. In the Government’s words, “the United Nations’ failure to adhere to procedural formalities does not determine the substance of the United States’ treaty obligations.”39 Beyond the government’s position, the D.C. plaintiffs’ opposition brief identifies the structural defect that distinguishes UNRWA from entities that courts have treated as immune, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children’s Fund, the United Nations Development Programme, and the World Food Programme.40 Those entities are governed by multilateral, deliberative executive boards or comparable memberstate structures that operate transparently and inclusively, allowing the United States to participate, which is a threshold requirement for immunity eligibility under the International Organizations Immunities Act (“IOIA”).41 Unlike those other entities, UNRWA is uniquely “not governed by a member-state executive board or comparable structure through which the United States can participate as a member,” and thus it uniquely fails the IOIA.42 The brief then argues that this same structural defect remains relevant under the CPIUN, because Congress did not understand ratification of that treaty to “expand entity-level immunity beyond what the IOIA already supplied.”43 State Department officials said as much at the ratification hearing itself: U.S. Permanent Representative Charles W. Yost and State Department Legal Adviser John R. Stevenson both emphasized at the time that the CPIUN made no significant change to the immunity afforded to entities.44 The Delaware plaintiffs also confront directly the most obvious objection to the deference argument: that the Executive’s position on UNRWA’s immunity reversed with the change in administrations. That reversal, they argue, is of no legal consequence. What commands deference is the Executive’s current interpretation of the treaty, because it is the (sitting, duly elected) Executive that is presently charged with interpreting and enforcing it.45 The “great weight” owed to the Government’s reading does not evaporate because a prior administration – at the United Nations’ request – may have then taken a different view. UNRWA prevailed in the Southern District of New York, where the Court held that UNRWA is immune under the treaties alone, based on two necessary premises – that the UN’s immunity extends to subsidiary organs, and that UNRWA is such a subsidiary organ.46 In its Second Circuit amicus brief challenging that ruling, the Government 37. Id. at 7 (“whether UNRWA is a ‘subsidiary organ’ of the United Nations turns on whether UNRWA is ‘performing’ the derivative ‘functions’ of the General Assembly. There is little basis under the text of the Charter to say the answer to that question is yes.”). 38. U.S. Amicus at 15–16. 39. U.S. SOI, supra note 1, at 14. 40. Pls.’ Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Def. UNRWA’s Mot. to Dismiss at 6–8, Estate of Sha’arabany v. UNRWA, No. 1:25-cv02490-RCL (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2026) (hereinafter “Sha’arabany Opposition”). 41. Id. at 5-7 (citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 288, 288a(b); Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 586 U.S. 199, 209–10 (2019)). 42. Id. at 7. 43. Id. at 8 (citing S. Exec. Rep. No. 91-17, at 5–6 (1970)). 44. S. Exec. Rep. No. 91-17, at 1–2, 8, 11 (1970). 45. Sumitomo Shoji Am., 457 U.S., supra note 34, at 185; Plaintiffs’ Opposition to UNRWA’s Motion to Dismiss at 5-10, Lavi v. UNRWA, No. 1:24-cv-00312-RGA (D. Del. Jan. 13, 2026) (hereinafter, “Lavi Opposition”). 46. Supra note 6, at 220–27.
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