38 No. 78 JUSTICE of whether such preemptive action is a legitimate act of self-defense remains controversial. Israel’s attack on the Iraqi Osirak nuclear facilities in 1981 was condemned by the UN Security Council and Israel was ordered to pay compensation to Iraq. The members of the Security Council were aware that Iraq was planning to eventually produce a nuclear bomb but nevertheless were unwilling to give a legal stamp of approval to the use of preemptive selfdefense. The United States and Iran The legitimacy of the United States attack is more problematic. The United States was not directly attacked by Iran. International Law allows one State to come to the aid of another State if the latter State was attacked and requests help. Israel was attacked by Iran and could have formally requested U.S. assistance. Israel, apparently, did not do so. One can surmise that for political and public relations reasons Israel did not want the United States public to be under the impression that the United States was fighting Israel’s war. The other possible United States claim of legitimacy was preemptive action against Iranian nuclear facilities. This could be justified in terms of realpolitik. Iran was clearly preparing the way for possession of nuclear weapons. It had highly enriched nuclear fuel to a near-weapons grade level and the International Atomic Energy Agency had declared that Iran was in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which it was a party. In June 2025, the Agency further declared that it was unable to verify that Iran was not acting to build a nuclear explosive device.4 Nevertheless, it is controversial whether international law, as it is today, permits preemptive self-defense, even in cases of nuclear proliferation. While the world might appreciate the United States action to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, the international legal situation is still being debated. Concluding Assessment Israel exercised its legitimate right of self-defense following Iran’s direct and indirect military attacks. While the United States actions against Iranian nuclear facilities are a welcome step to prevent an aggressive terror supporting State from acquiring nuclear weapons, the legitimacy of the U.S. action, under international law, is controversial. Subsequent Developments Both Iran and the United States expressed willingness to negotiate the nuclear issues. Iran, however, in an astute negotiating tactic, claimed the right to supervise and charge fees for ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz, and that this issue also be negotiated. Iran was aware that the Iranian nuclear issue was a long-term problem for the United States, but that any interruption of oil shipments posed an immediate political problem for the United States President. International Law requires that States bordering a strait allow “transit passage” (which includes freedom of navigation) through the strait. Iran claims that this injunction appears in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Iran is not a party to the treaty. (Neither is the United States.) Most jurists hold that the provision in the 1982 Convention regarding straits is by now customary law binding on all States. Iran contends that this is not the case. The result of this Iranian negotiation tactic is that Iran and the United States may find themselves negotiating on points of law concerning international straits rather than on the original core issue of Iran’s attempt to build nuclear weapons.n Ambassador Robbie Sabel is a Professor of International Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the former Legal Advisor to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4. International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2025/38 Date: June 12, 2025.
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