24 No. 78 JUSTICE Recommendations: Dwelling Alone Is Not an Option Many aspects of the international community’s conduct toward Israel are a source of deep and legitimate frustration. There is no doubt that Israel is singled out, treated unfairly, and subjected to entrenched anti-Israel bias in multiple fora. It will always be outnumbered in international institutions and in the court of public opinion. Nevertheless, there is much that Israel can – and must – do to mitigate and contend with these challenges. The following recommendations are offered in that spirit. Commitment to compliance. The single most important recommendation is continued, visible, and enforced commitment to compliance with international law – including robust investigation and prosecution of credible allegations. This is both a moral imperative and a strategic necessity: without it, no legal defense can be sustained. Strengthening democratic institutions. Israel’s domestic legal institutions – an independent judiciary, a strong Attorney General, an effective Military Advocate General – are not obstacles to national security. They are its enablers, both by promoting actual compliance and by providing the complementarity defense without which Israel stands exposed before international tribunals. Recent decisions by Israel’s Supreme Court – including rulings on the detention conditions of Gazan detainees and on Israel’s humanitarian policy during the Gaza hostilities – have been cited by Israel in international proceedings as evidence of the strength and independence of its judicial system. This is precisely the kind of domestic accountability that bolsters Israel’s credibility abroad. Engagement, not abandonment. Israel must not desert the playing field. Even where the outcome of a proceeding is likely unfavorable, engagement can mitigate harm. The ICJ’s provisional measures orders in the South Africa case, for example, stopped well short of granting South Africa’s demand that Israel end its operations – a result fairly attributable, in significant part, to Israel’s own submissions. Beyond litigation, a whole-of-government approach is needed – integrating legal strategy with public diplomacy, intelligence support, and coordination among the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, and the IDF, including the Military Advocate General’s Corps. Leveraging alliances. Western democracies increasingly acknowledge the threat of armed non-state actors and the need to learn from Israel’s experience. Reports by international observers and organizations have documented the extraordinary challenges of urban warfare against such adversaries.21 Israel should leverage these shared concerns to coordinate responses to international initiatives constraining effective responses to such threats, and build coalitions with like-minded states. Equipping allies and advocates. Israel must also give its supporters outside Israel the tools to complement its governmental efforts in each country. Publishing thorough investigative reports, appearing before international tribunals, publishing official position papers,22 and speaking transparently to the media – all of these provide crucial information that advocates in each country can use for effective advocacy. Addressing the situation in the West Bank / Judea and Samaria. Violence by Israeli citizens, discrimination, property damage, dispossession, and other violations of the rights of Palestinian residents must be addressed, investigated, and rectified through effective law enforcement. Failure to do so not only causes direct harm – it provides ammunition to those seeking to delegitimize Israel in every available forum. Reform of international institutions. The politicization of international legal institutions should not be passively accepted. Israel should actively seek – in coordination with like-minded states – to reform the institutional and procedural flaws that enable bias and procedural abuse in bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council, the ICC 21. See e.g., High Level Military Group, Amicus Curiae observation of High Level Military Group, August 2024, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/0902ebd180920f26.pdf; JINSA Staff, “The October 7 War: Observations, October 2023 - May 2024” JINSA (May 30, 2024), available at https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/gaza-warobservations-2023-2024/ 22. See e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Hamas-Israel Conflict 2023: Key Legal Aspects,” GOV.IL (Dec. 3, 2023), available at https://www.gov.il/en/pages/hamas-israel-conflict2023-key-legal-aspects; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “HamasIsrael Conflict 2023: Frequently Asked Questions,” GOV.IL (Dec. 6, 2023), available at https://www.gov.il/en/pages/ swords-of-iron-faq-6-dec-2023; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel-Hamas Conflict 2023: Humanitarian Efforts,” GOV.IL (Dec.14, 2023), available at https://www.gov.il/en/pages/israel-hamas-conflict-2023-humanitarian-efforts
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