76 No. 76 JUSTICE Precautions and proportionality in attacks The IDF takes all feasible precautions in attack to mitigate the expected incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects, taking into account the relevant circumstances ruling at the time.43 Despite the many operational and intelligence challenges that stem from conducting hostilities over 1,500 kilometers away from Israel without forward Israeli bases in the region, the IDF employed a wide range of precautionary measures during the Operation. These include carefully calibrating targeting procedures, measures taken in the selection of weapons and munitions, consideration of the timing of strikes (such as scheduling attacks on weapons production facilities at night to reduce likelihood of civilian presence in the surroundings), and planning and decision-making processes which took into account the foreseeable civilian harm from potential radioactive fallout resulting from attacks on nuclear facilities. Environmental and public-safety concerns were integral to the planning of strikes on nuclear-related military objectives – a fact underscored by the IAEA Director General’s observation that these operations resulted in negligible nuclear contamination with no reports of an increase of off-site radiation levels.44 Where circumstances allowed, the IDF also provided effective advance warnings of attacks to allow the civilian population to distance itself prior to attacks.45 When providing such warnings, the IDF limited the geographic scope of areas to which the warnings were applicable, while providing sufficient time before the attack to permit effective action on the part of civilians. Where operational conditions allowed, the IDF disseminated detailed warnings in Farsi via available communication platforms, including social media, and provided maps identifying the specific areas in which the attacks were to occur together with instructions as to where civilians should evacuate for their safety (while Iran, on its part, shut down access to the internet in Iran during most of the Operation – a circumstance outside Israel’s control).46 In certain cases, and where feasible to do so, the IDF issued warnings through direct phone calls. For example, prior to the IDF’s attack on the broadcasting authority building mentioned above, which was used for military purposes and located in the middle of Tehran, the IDF issued recorded and written advance warnings on social media and made direct phone calls to encourage evacuation of the structure and the surrounding areas. Israel also abides by the rule of proportionality in conducting attacks. According to this rule, it is prohibited to carry out an attack when the expected incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack.47 Under the proportionality rule, military advantage may refer to the advantage anticipated from an attack as a whole, and civilian harm may extend to the effects of foreseeable environmental damage that is expected to occur from attacks that may cause the release of dangerous forces, including radioactive fallout. www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/june-25-pr/the-idf-eliminated-nine-senior-scientists-andexperts-in-the-iranian-nuclear-project/; Elimination of Senior Scientists in the Iranian Regime’s Nuclear Project, IDF (June 25, 2025), https://idfanc.activetrail. biz/ANC26052509876121267. 43. This customary rule is reflected in Article 57(2) of Additional Protocol I. 44. IAEA Director General Grossi’s Statement to UNSC on Situation in Iran, IAEA (June 20, 2025), https://www.iaea. org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-general-grossis-statement-to-unsc-on-situation-in-iran-20-june-2025. 45. This customary rule is reflected in Article 57(2)(c) of Additional Protocol I, which states that ‘effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.’ 46. See, for example, IDF Farsi (@IDFFarsi), X (formerly Twitter) (June 16, 2025, 4:28 PM (EEST)), https://x.com/ IDFFarsi/status/1934604000239767898; IDF Farsi (@IDFFarsi), X (formerly Twitter) (June 18, 2025, 1:41 AM (EEST)), https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/1935105531246788793; IDF Farsi (@IDFFarsi), X (formerly Twitter) (June 19, 2025, 4:22 AM (EEST)), https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/1935508510118183064. 47. This customary rule is reflected in Article 57(2)(b) of Additional Protocol I, which states that ‘an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent … that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.’
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