70 No. 76 JUSTICE iii. Weakening of the ‘ring of fire’ around Israel and air defenses in Syria and Iran The Operation also took place during Israel’s ongoing armed conflicts with various armed groups supported by Iran, that are close to and surround Israel’s borders – Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, various Shiite militias in the region, and the Houthis. These armed groups have been carrying out attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. These armed groups form part of a broader Iranian strategy to surround Israel with a network of hostile fronts and actors – in pursuit of the regime’s declared goal of destroying the State of Israel. The Iranian regime has invested massively in cultivating and building these groups’ military capabilities. Its goal has been to create a forward layer of offensive threat proximate to Israel’s borders that can be leveraged in multiple ways: to enable Iran to wage protracted armed conflicts against Israel, while maintaining a degree of political and legal deniability; to deter Israel from carrying out military operations against Iran (which requires flying through hostile airspace and would require contending with attacks from such armed groups simultaneously); and to use force against Israel in concert with direct attacks by Iranian armed forces, including from Iranian territory. Iran’s efforts made it possible for these groups to directly target Israel’s civilian population throughout its entire territory, through aerial attacks and by land and sea invasions, thereby compelling the IDF to divert and dedicate substantial defensive resources. Over the years, these armed groups have caused thousands of deaths and injuries, and wrought destruction in Israel. The intensity of these conflicts increased dramatically following Hamas’s brutal terrorist attacks starting on October 7, 2023, after which other Iranian-affiliated armed groups also drastically intensified their attacks on Israel. Israel has been defending itself against these attacks on multiple fronts, and over the past 22 months has significantly degraded the military capabilities of these armed groups. Likewise, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria deprived the Iranian regime of an important military ally and a transit corridor and logistical hub for delivering weapons to Hezbollah and others in Lebanon and Syria. The currently-reduced capabilities of these groups, together with Iran’s reduced air defense capabilities following Israel’s strikes on such assets in response to Iran’s attacks in April and October 2024 (see below), coalesced with the Iranian regime’s acceleration of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. The Iranian regime has also been actively working to replenish the arsenals and to rebuild the capabilities of these armed groups, as well as to counter Israeli intelligence efforts and to reestablish its air defenses – further emphasizing the time-sensitivity of Israel’s ability to take largescale and effective military action against the Iranian nuclear weapons program. 2. The ongoing armed conflict between Israel and Iran and the law of armed conflict as the governing legal framework The Operation took place as part of an ongoing armed conflict between Iran and Israel and thus was governed by the rules of the law of armed conflict (LOAC, also known as international humanitarian law (IHL), or the jus in bello) applicable to international armed conflicts. This armed conflict, commenced by Iranian aggression against Israel, has been ongoing for years and has different facets: a. Direct hostilities between Iran and Israel The Iranian regime has carried out direct attacks and other military operations against Israel and against Israeli officials in Israel and overseas. These attacks have occurred in various domains of warfare. They include overt attacks, reported attacks that have not been openly attributed to the regime, and unreported covert attacks, occurring in all domains of warfare – land, air, sea, and cyberspace. They have emanated from Iranian territory as well as from the territory of third parties. For example, in 2018, an Iranian armed drone launched from Syria to carry out an attack in Israel was intercepted in Israeli airspace by the IDF, followed by IDF strikes in Syria against IRGC and Syrian military infrastructure. In the months that followed, Iran launched multiple rocket barrages against Israel from Syria, and Israel attacked additional IRGC and Syrian military infrastructure in Syria, as a result of which several Iranian soldiers that were stationed in Syria, were killed. In January 2019, the IDF struck several IRGC targets inside Syria, including munition storage sites, a military base in Damascus International Airport, an intelligence base and a military training base. The Iranian regime subsequently fired a rocket from Syria at Israel, which was intercepted by the IDF.20 In the cyber
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjgzNzA=