53 Winter 2026 some international law experts have concluded that it is more accurate to treat Abkhazia as a “state-like entity”6 and South Ossetia as a “‘stabilised de facto regime’ which enjoys partial international subjectivity.”7 By the same analysis, the breakaway entity we refer to herein as “Gazan Palestine” also qualifies as a “statelike” entity. A 2016 study described how Hamas separated the Gaza Strip from the West Bank and the PA to establish a new proto state in Gaza: In examining Hamas’s record in balancing political and governance imperatives and armed struggle, the research looks especially at Hamas’s ability to effectively exercise as well as legitimize a monopoly on force in the Gaza Strip after the group assumed its control in 2007. This is because the monopoly on the “legitimate use of physical force” resulting in the “capacity to unilaterally impose and enforce collectively binding decisions against the resistance of those who oppose them” is a core attribute of statehood and effective sovereignty.8 Thus, the June 2007 Hamas coup resulted in the Gaza Strip seceding from West Bank Palestine and establishing itself as a separate state-like entity, akin to a stand-alone putative- or proto-state. Although Gaza after June 2007 never achieved full-fledged statehood under international law, it no longer remained part of the so-called “State of Palestine” either. The June 2007 Hamas coup therefore resulted in Palestine splitting into two completely separate entities, West Bank Palestine and Gazan Palestine. The international law of secession supports the argument that Gazan Palestine had established itself as a separate political entity from West Bank Palestine as a result of the June 2007 coup. James Crawford defines “secession” as “the creation of a state by the use or threat of force without the consent of the former sovereign.”9 Although the PA did not possess sovereignty over Gaza or the West Bank as of June 2007, every other attribute of secession Crawford identifies is applicable to the Hamas coup. For example, Crawford notes that “a seceding territory could be recognized as a State if it governed its territory effectively and with sufficient stability, such that there was no real likelihood of the previous sovereign (whether because of the latter’s virtual relinquishment of its position or its defeat in the field) reasserting its position.”10 Prosecution considers that South Ossetia was a part of Georgia at the time of commission of the alleged crimes and occupied by Russia at least until 10 October 2010. As such, the Court may exercise jurisdiction over all alleged crimes committed on Georgian territory during the armed conflict period, irrespective of the nationality of the accused.”). 6. A. Nussberger, “Abkhazia,” OXFORD PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, ¶ 27 (Jan. 2013), available at https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/ law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e2069? rskey=ngTVZP&result=1&prd=OPIL. 7. A. Nussberger, “South Ossetia,” OXFORD PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, ¶ 22 (Jan. 2013), available at https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/ law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e2068. 8. B. Bertie and B. Gutiérrez, “Rebel-to-Political and Back? Hamas as a Security Provider in Gaza Between Rebellion, Politics and Governance,” 23 DEMOCRATIZATION 1059, 1060 (2016). 9. J. Crawford, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 247 (Oxford Univ. Press 1979). 10. Id., at 255-56. Crawford’s description fits the Gaza situation well. Hamas violently overthrew and ousted the PA in June 2007. The PA had no chance of regaining control of Gaza, or even minimally participating in Gaza’s governance as of January 2015, when the PA submitted its instrument of accession to the Rome Statute to the United Nations. Hamas by that time had been exercising sole control of Gaza and ruling it as a separate state-like entity for nearly a decade. Therefore, as of January 2015 the PA had no actual or apparent legal authority to speak for Hamas/Gaza, nor to bind Hamas/Gaza to the PA’s accession to the Rome Statute on behalf of the “State of Palestine.” If Gazan Palestine desired to submit itself to the ICC’s jurisdiction, then it should have deposited its own instrument of accession with the court, but it did not do so. The ICC, for its part, never asked the Government of Gaza whether it agreed to the PA’s instrument of accession, nor (as discussed below) has Hamas ever accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction over Gazan nationals. The PA’s Accession to the Rome Statute Under the Rome Statute, the ICC’s jurisdiction applies only to states who accede to the Statute and become parties to the Statute. Once a state becomes a party to
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