JUSTICE - No. 75

47 Fall 2025 However, in parallel, the UNGA starts adopting the language of self-determination of the “Palestinian people” and the “inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people” (UNGA Resolutions 2649 (November 30, 1970), Resolution 3236 (November 22, 1974), Resolution 3414 (December 5, 1975)). In 1978, UNGA resolution 33/113 refers to “Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied” by Israel, which becomes “continued Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories” in 1981 (UNGA Resolution 36/120), “occupied Palestinian Arab territories, including Jerusalem” in 1982 (UNGA Resolution ES-7/4), “Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem” in 1989 (UNGA Resolution 44/40), and “occupied Palestinian Territory” in 1990 (UNGA Resolution 45/74). As to self-determination, in 1980 the UNGA started linking the exercise of that right with the territories occupied in 1967 (see UNGA Resolution 35/169 (December 15, 1980)), explicitly claiming in 1988 “the need to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their sovereignty over their territory occupied since 1967” (UNGA Resolution 43/177 (December 15, 1988)). The inconsistency of the language used at the UNGA can be illustrated by its consideration of the alleged illegality of the occupation. Imseis accepts that, following an analysis of relevant UNGA practice: “… in 1975 and 1976 the General Assembly condemned the occupation as a ‘violation of the Charter of the United Nations’, while from 1977 to 1981 it expressly qualified it as ‘illegal’. Between 1981 and 1991 the Assembly dropped this reference and reverted to condemning the occupation as a ‘violation of the Charter of the United Nations’, albeit demanding Israel’s ‘immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal’. Taken together, this practice suggests the Assembly was of the view that at least by the eighth year of the occupation, Israel’s presence in the OPT had become illegal for being in violation of the jus ad bellum provisions of the Charter and, accordingly, could not condition its end on negotiation in line with the law of state responsibility. The problem arises from the fact that from 1992 onward – just after the convening of the Madrid Peace Conference – all such references in Assembly resolutions simply vanish. From that point on, the Assembly has satisfied itself with an annual affirmation that ‘the occupation itself’ constitutes a ‘grave’, ‘gross’ or ‘primary’ violation only of ‘human rights’, while expressing the ‘hope’ that the parties are able to bring it to an end through negotiation.”198 Interestingly, what does emerge consistently from UN Resolutions is the need to resolve the situation through negotiation. More specifically, UN Resolutions do not specifically address the issue of sovereign legal title, nor do they delimit Israel’s or Palestine’s borders. For example, Resolution 67/19 expressly refers to the need to resolve the issue of borders via negotiations, highlighting that the territorial issues are still unsettled. It does not foreclose land swaps (which nearly all agree are essential to any two-State solution).199 The resolution, in its own terms, leaves the exact path of the boundary line to be determined by political negotiations, not by international lawyers.200 Moreover, Security Council Resolution 2334 leaves the question of borders open. While the resolution refers to a Palestinian territory, it makes no determinations as to its scope. Indeed, by urging intensification and acceleration of international and regional diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace on the basis of “the relevant United Nations resolutions, the Madrid terms of reference, including the principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Quartet Roadmap”, Resolution 2334 leaves open the question of the status of West Bank and Gaza territory and the borders of a future Palestinian State.201 198. Ardi Imseis, Negotiating the Illegal: On the United Nations and the Illegal Occupation of Palestine, 1967–2020, 31 Eur. J. Int. Law. 3, 1055, 1069-1070 (2020). 199. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, ¶ 58 (Univ. of Cambridge 2nd ed. 2019). 200. See DAVID LUBAN, Palestine and the ICC – Some Legal Questions, JUST SECURITY, Jan. 2, 2015, https://www. justsecurity.org/18817/Palestine-icc-legal-questions/ 201. See Pnina Sharvit Baruch, UN Security Council Resolution 2334: The Legal significance, 48, INSS 275, 329-333 (2016).

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