21 Fall 2025 50. In Armed Activities, the Court concluded that the occupation of the Congolese province of Ituri resulted from an unlawful use of force by Uganda.74 The Judgment’s dispositif provides that “the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in military activities against the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the latter’s territory, by occupying Ituri[…] violated the principle of non-use of force in international relations and the principle of non-intervention[.]’.”75 Ronen notes that the “Court listed the ‘occupation of Ituri’ as an international wrongful act, without expressly stating the ground for its illegality: thus it remains unclear whether the Court regarded the illegality of the occupation as a consequence of the violation of jus ad bellum or whether it considered any occupation to be ipso facto illegal. The dispositif is ambiguous and sheds little light on the matter.”76 51. A more likely interpretation, Ronen suggests, is that the phrase “by occupying Ituri” is implicitly qualified by a phrase such as “without justification” or “aggressively” and the occupation by Uganda was characterised as violating the principle of the non-use of force because it arose through a violation of the jus ad bellum.77 Ronen notes that this position is supported by the separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans, which stated that “the occupation of Ituri should not have been characterized in a direct sense as a violation of the principle of the nonuse of force.”78 Ronen notes that it is “not clear whether Judge Kooijmans regarded the majority’s error as one of drafting or of law; from the fact that he did not dissent on this point but only appended a separate opinion, the former may be inferred. This strengthens the interpretation of the majority opinion proposed above, namely tying the illegality of the occupation to the illegal use of force.” 52. That being so, the claimed illegality arising from Uganda’s occupation of Ituri stemmed from Uganda’s violation of the principle of the non-use of force, and the violation of Uganda’s general obligation under customary international law to cease internationally wrongful conduct, and to eliminate its consequences.80 As such, the Judgment in Armed Activities does not establish or reflect the existence of a separate legal criterion of “illegal occupation”, even arising from the unlawful use of force. 53. With respect to South Africa’s continuing occupation of Namibia following the termination of its mandate to administer the territory, the Court stated that “by maintaining the present illegal situation, and occupying the Territory without title, South Africa incurs international responsibilities…”81 It has been suggested that this statement implies that the Court found South Africa’s occupation of Namibia to be illegal; however, this is not stated in terms, and it is notable that the Court did not use the term “illegal occupation” to describe the situation.82 Ronen notes that from that moment, “the Security Council and the General Assembly… began to refer to Namibia as ‘illegally occupied’” and to a situation of “illegal occupation”, whereas it had until then referred to Namibia as territory in which South Africa maintained an “illegal presence.”83 Portugal’s failure to end its colonial administration over Guinea-Bissau following its declaration of independence led the General Assembly to adopt Resolution 3061 (1973), which “strongly condemn[ed] the policies of the Government of Portugal in 74. Armed Activities, paras. 165, 171. Also see Ronen, at p. 224 (“… the occupation of Ituri is a simple case of aggressive use of force”). 75. Armed Activities, at para. 345. 76. Ronen, p. 225. 77. Id. 78. Armed Activities, Separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para. 56. 79. Ronen, p. 226. 80. See, e.g., Zemach, p. 4. 81. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16, para. 118. 82. Ronen, p. 214. 83. Id.
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