JUSTICE - No. 75

13 Fall 2025 of the final disposition of these areas shall be determined only by negotiation. Until then, both sides have agreed to provisional arrangements, which continue to apply and govern the legal relationship between them today. 22. In Annex “A” we also provide a comparison of the different terminology used by UN bodies (in political statements) to describe these territories. This comparison shows that the terms used in this context have evolved over the years, not as a result of any change in legal status, but rather as a result of structural, diplomatic, and political dynamics within the UN organisation. Consequently, the reference by the General Assembly to these territories as “Palestinian territory,” while reflecting the political aspirations of certain parties, should not be confused with statements of law and fact. The international and bilateral framework for resolution of the conflict 23. The primary mechanism for international dispute resolution is negotiation and agreement.22 UN Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) establish a framework for peace which has been mutually endorsed and agreed by both parties, and they remain the international framework for resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Resolutions 242 and 338 leave open the possibility – indeed probability – of Israeli sovereignty in parts of the West Bank in a final peace agreement. Resolution 242 provides that peace “should” (not “must”) include withdrawal of Israeli forces “from territories occupied in the recent conflict”, not from “all the territories occupied” in that conflict. The Security Council’s deliberations suggest that this wording was no accident and many of the drafters intended that withdrawal “is required from some but not all of the territories.”24 Resolution 338 “calls upon” the parties to implement Resolution 242. 24. Resolution 242’s “land-for-peace” scheme remains the cornerstone of all proposed peace plans. It served as a basis for the regional peace initiative in Camp David in 1978; the Israel-Egypt Treaty of Peace of 1979; and the Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace of 1994. Furthermore, all Israeli-Palestinian agreements, including the Interim Agreement (discussed further at paragraph 26 below), invoke both Resolution 242 and Resolution 338.25 These Resolutions have also been invoked in numerous decisions of international organisations (including the UN) relating to the ultimate resolution of the regional conflict. The Security Council and General Assembly have reiterated on numerous occasions their support for the existing bilateral agreements as the applicable legal framework for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and determining the sovereign status of the territory in 22. See, e.g., statements made during the debate at the General Assembly on Resolution 77/247, at which (for example) the representative of the United States stated that “a negotiated two-State solution remains the best way to ensure Israel’s security and fulfil the Palestinian desire for a State of their own.” Fourth Committee Hears Support for Referring Question of Palestine to International Court of Justice for Advisory Opinion, GA/SPD/770, 10 November 2022. 23. Notably, Resolution 242 (1967) also interrelates Israeli withdrawal with its right to “secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.” See also A. J. Goldberg, ‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and the Prospects for Peace in the Middle East’, 12 (2) Col. J. Transnat'l L. (1973) 187 (hereinafter “Goldberg”), p. 190. 24. See Goldberg, pp.190-192 (Amb. Arthur Goldberg, US ambassador to the UN in 1967, suggesting that there is no single, objectively correct interpretation of Resolution 242, that its ambiguities were intended, and that the vagueness and flexibility enabled the parties to accept the resolution). See also Security Council, S/PV.1382 (OR), 22 November 1967, para. 93 (where Mr. Eban (Israel) said: “For us, the resolution says what it says. It does not say that which it has specifically and consciously avoided saying”). 25. See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo Accords), 13 September 1993, Article I (hereinafter “Declaration of Principles”); Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (Cairo Agreement), 4 May 1994, Preamble; and Interim Agreement, Preamble. These resolutions were also similarly endorsed by the Arab League in its March 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.

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