JUSTICE - No. 74

28 No. 74 JUSTICE they refused to denounce their faith. UCLA does not dispute this.” The decision against UCLA showcases the judiciary’s willingness to intervene when evidence of blatant antisemitism emerges. UCLA subsequently decided not to appeal the decision. Another important development transpired in July 2024, when the parties in Ingber v. New York University announced a comprehensive settlement of the Title VI lawsuit brought by three Jewish students who alleged pervasive antisemitism on campus following October 7.4 This was the first such settlement of a post-October 7 Title VI antisemitism lawsuit, and it provided a framework and model for the meaningful, comprehensive reforms. The settlement terms include that NYU agreed to revise its conduct guidelines to explicitly address antisemitism and introduce mandatory antisemitism training for students, faculty, and staff, along with the submission of annual reports to the Board of Trustees. Additionally, NYU created a Title VI Coordinator role modeled after the Title IX framework,5 who is responsible for overseeing compliance and reporting on all Title VI-related complaints. NYU also adopted the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (“IHRA”) definition of antisemitism, establishing a standard for identifying antisemitic behavior. NYU also agreed to a monetary payment, the details of which remain confidential. Finally, NYU pledged academic support for Judaic studies and research into antisemitism. NYU’s settlement serves as a blueprint and demonstrates how universities can resolve disputes by committing to ongoing oversight, curriculum development, and transparent reporting structures. On the dispositive motion front, in August and November 2024, U.S. District Judge Richard Stearns denied Harvard’s motions to dismiss two Title VI lawsuits filed against it. Notably, just weeks before denying the first of Harvard’s motions to dismiss, the same judge granted MIT’s motion to dismiss a Title VI lawsuit brought against that school. In his decision in the Harvard case, Judge Stearns explained the main differences between the two schools’ conduct – distinctions that can provide important lessons for universities and litigators alike. As Judge Stearns explained, under Title VI, a school will be liable if it acted with “deliberate indifference” to discrimination on campus. In the case against MIT, Judge Stearns found that MIT did not act with “deliberate indifference” because it took adequate steps to address on-campus protests that posed a potential threat to Jewish students by issuing public statements condemning antisemitism and providing resources to affected students.6 By contrast, Judge Stearns found that Harvard’s response to these hateful protests was “at best, indecisive, vacillating, and at times internally contradictory,” and thus an act of deliberate indifference.7 Stearns reasoned that each of Harvard’s purported responses aimed at combatting antisemitism were “hollow when it came to taking disciplinary measures against offending students and faculty.”8 Further explaining the differences between the two universities’ conduct, the judge explained that while MIT may have failed to anticipate the bigotry and hateful behavior of its students, MIT nevertheless “respond[ed] with a perhaps overly measured but nonetheless consistent sense of purpose in returning civil order and discourse to its campus.” Judge Stearns explained that “the law expects reasonable and proportionate acts by university officials.” If, by contrast, a school’s response is “so lax, so misdirected, or so poorly executed as to be clearly unreasonable under the known circumstances,”9 the school will be found liable.10 Unlike the facts alleged against MIT, the facts alleged against Harvard plausibly established a failure to respond reasonably pursuant to the commands of Title VI. In short, Judge Stearns found that “the facts as pled show that Harvard failed its Jewish students.”11 4. Ingber v. New York University, 2024 WL 2046106 (S.D.N.Y., 2024). 5. Title IX is a federal law that prohibits sex-based discrimination in educational institutions receiving federal funding, aiming to promote gender equality in education. 6. Memorandum and Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, StandWithUs Center for Legal Justice v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, No. 1:24-cv-10577 (D. Mass. July 30, 2024), available at https: //www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/ document/StandWithUsCenterforLegalJusticee talvMassachusettsInstituteofTech/2?doc id=X7C16UGAOGN9VCPSA905LJ5EBV6 7. Memorandum and Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Kestenbaum v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 1:24-cv-10092 (D. Mass. Aug. 6, 2024), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ USCOURTS-mad-1_24-cv-10092/pdf/USCOURTSmad-1_24-cv-10092-0.pdf 8. Id. 9. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 175 (1st Cir. 2007). 10. Supra note 4. 11. Id.

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