5 Fall 2024 Even when facing a cruel enemy that does not respect the law, we are still committed to respecting the rule of law as we pursue our military objectives. Even in this setting these principles can coexist. The laws of armed conflict allow for just this. I will provide a few examples. I first address how a military target is defined. Naturally, anything belonging to the opposing military is considered to be military. In our context, the terror armies established by terrorist organizations resemble what is more and more recognizable to us as armies. Accordingly, any part of the organized armed group we are fighting against constitutes a legitimate military target. When this terror army embeds itself deeply within the civilian population, structures and infrastructure that would otherwise be civilian by nature but that in effect are used for military purposes or are designated by the enemy for military use, become legitimate military targets under international law. Thus, Hamas systematically and intentionally turns many structures situated in the heart of the civilian population into military targets. Over the two decades during which Hamas has controlled Gaza, they have built a military force comprised of tens of thousands of fighters, and capabilities which include tens of thousands of rockets, explosives, intelligence capabilities, observation and firing posts, command and control centers. All of this has been done mostly without building classic military bases. There are tens of thousands of military structures located in civilian buildings. And above all, or rather, beneath it, Hamas has established a sprawling tunnel system. The tunnel system that is intended solely for military purposes has been built under densely populated urban areas – with thousands of tunnel entrances hidden in civilian homes, hospitals, UN facilities, schools, and mosques. The tunnels themselves, hundreds of kilometers long, pass between buildings, allowing Hamas terrorists to hide, coordinate fighting, and ambush IDF soldiers. The laws of war not only prohibit Hamas's actions but also enable us – the side which seeks to uphold international law – to operate within the legal framework and strike those military targets, despite Hamas’s choice to hide them within the urban maze of the Gaza Strip. When establishing a military target, one must consider the incidental damage that may be caused to the civilian population. I do not take lightly the harm caused to civilians. However, the very fact that incidental damage is considered and regulated by the laws of war, as well as the statement that ‘’’collateral damage” must be proportional to the military gain, demonstrates that some degree of harm to the civilian population, while regrettable, can be a possible and lawful result of engaging in combat. Another important example is the obligation to take precautions before an attack. The recognized legal duty under customary international law is to take all feasible measures to minimize expected harm to civilians or civilian property. This principle is naturally influenced by context. An example of this is the difference between the operations Israel has conducted in recent decades and the current war. In a short and limited conflict, like previous engagements in the Gaza Strip where the scale of the conflict and the level of threat allowed for significant resource allocation to damage mitigation efforts, the precautionary measures required, which are based on the resources at an army’s disposal, are more substantial. In contrast, in the current war, when Israel is under real and immediate threat from seven fronts, and human, technological, and logistical resources are stretched thin because they are simultaneously required to address numerous challenges (the level of feasible precautionary measures), the required level of precautionary measures under the law is different. A good illustration of this is the extensive use that the IDF made in the past of the practice known as “roof knocking” to issue a warning before attacks. In the current war, the use of this method is relatively less frequent, as it is not feasible to use this method and these munitions for every single attack. This does not in any way mean that the IDF is exempt from taking precautions. In fact, the IDF invests significant resources in carrying out necessary actions to mitigate harm to civilians and invests heavily in deploying appropriate precautionary measures for the characteristics of the current war. As an example, in consideration of the scale of the fighting, and the massive number of military targets located in the urban area – and beneath it – the IDF invests heavily in evacuating civilians from combat zones for their protection. As part of this effort, over fifteen million recorded phone calls and about one-hundred thousand personal phone calls have been made to warn civilians before attacks; more than fifteen million text messages have been sent; and over ten million leaflets have been dropped over the Gaza Strip, all containing clear instructions aimed at warning and allowing the population to evacuate from combat zones. All of these serve as examples of how we uphold our obligation to take precautionary measures. These are just two examples of how the laws of war
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