7 Spring 2023 39. Eritrea/Yemen - Sovereignty and Maritime Delimitation in the Red Sea, case no. 1996-04 “Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Stage - Maritime Delimitation,” Dec. 17, 1999 [PCA], at para. 84; Julia Lisztwan, “Stability of Maritime Boundary Agreements, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 153, 180-181 (2012); Constantinos Yiallourides, Joint Development of Seabed Resources in Areas of Overlapping Maritime Claims: An Analysis of Precedents in State Practice, 31 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 129 (2018); Youri van Logchem, THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF STATES IN DISPUTED MARITIME AREAS 249 (Cambridge University Press, 2021). 40. Yiallourides, supra note 39, pp. 138-140; Vasco BeckerWeinberg, JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF HYDROCARBON DEPOSITS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 128 (2014). 41. Agreement between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, supra note 9; Yiallourides et al., supra note 5. It seems that Cyprus and Lebanon agreed to continue diplomatic talks to ratify the agreement. See https://www.timesofisrael.com/afterisrael-deal-lebanon-and-cyprus-agree-to-move-forwardon-maritime-border-talks/ 42. Supra note 12. For Lebanon contestation, see letter dated 20 June 2011 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of Lebanon, supra note 13. 43. Supra note 13. 44. See for example, Agreement between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, supra note 9, Art. 3. 45. See further discussion, Yiallourides et al., supra note 5. 46. See press release, Cyprus’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at https://mfa.gov.cy/press-releases/2022/10/12/ agreement-israel-lebanon-oct-2022/ 47. Ibid. 48. See examples of reports at https://knews.kathimerini.com. cy/en/news/cyprus-probes-dotted-line-in-israel-lebanon-deal Not only do these agreements circumvent the legal regime by addressing activities not regulated in UNCLOS, at least with respect to the CS or EEZ (i.e., resource utilization rather than delimitation), they also circumvent the legal regime by creating permanent rather than “provisional” arrangements. These agreements may jeopardize reaching a final delimitation agreement, since they might alter the environment in a way that will affect the possible area that would be attributed to each party. It is also interesting that international oil and gas companies have significantly influenced the conclusion of such bilateral agreements. States often rely on the funds, equipment, and expertise of such companies to develop their offshore resources. In addition to geological conditions, political and economic stability also helps promote private investments. Bilateral agreements thus encourage international corporations to operate in disputed maritime zones by increasing legal certainty concerning the rights of the states in these areas.40 3. Compliance with Other Agreements of the Parties in the Area As mentioned above, the agreement between Israel and Lebanon follows two other agreements in the area – between Israel and Cyprus (in force), and between Lebanon and Cyprus (not in force).41 Israel and Cyprus used point 1 as the northern starting point for their agreement, which Lebanon contested.42 Lebanon and Cyprus used point 23 as the southern starting point for their agreement.43 The fact that Israel and Lebanon agreed on point 23 as the boundary line between them, essentially accepting Lebanon’s claim, means that point 1 between Israel and Cyprus is now located in Lebanon’s maritime zone. This requires a revision of the relevant agreement. Both agreements with Cyprus recognize the possibility of reviewing and changing the boundary in light of a future delimitation agreement between Israel and Lebanon. However, the agreements with Cyprus require notification and consultation with Cyprus during the negotiations.44 If Israel and Lebanon have not done so, this might be a breach of the agreement with Cyprus.45 Cyprus has requested from the parties notification and consultation on the agreement,46 but there is no indication that the parties have done so. The language used by the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicates that there is no claim of a breach of agreement with Cyprus or denial of the request for consultations.47 However, the Ministry’s spokesperson indicated that Cyprus requested official information from Lebanon after the conclusion of the agreement.48 This may confirm that the procedural requirements concerning Cyprus have not been met. Concluding Remarks The maritime delimitation agreement between Israel and Lebanon is a historical and unique agreement that grants benefits to both parties. The agreement may also encourage delimitation of the boundary between Lebanon and Cyprus. While the agreement poses a few challenges to Israel from the perspective of both Israeli law and international law, it seems that the agreement promotes the purpose of peaceful resolution of disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, in accordance with international law. n Adv. Shani Friedman is a PhD student and a research fellow at the Law Faculty, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
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