5 Spring 2023 apply, and any waiver of such areas requires prior approval by referendum or a majority of 80 Knesset members. There are scholars who argue that the Israeli Basic Law: Referendum does not apply in this case. The Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) issued its decision on petitions against the agreement, some of which were based on the Basic Law (HCJ 6654/22, Kohelet Forum v. Prime Minister, Dec. 13, 2022). The HCJ accepted the Israeli government's position that the law does not apply since the boundary between the states was never demarcated and delimited and thus the law, jurisdiction and administration of the State of Israel do not apply in the relevant maritime zones and rejected the petitions. Even if we accept that Israel may have signed the agreement ultra vires with respect to part of the disputed area, it is still obligated to abide by the agreement in accordance with international law.26 2. Compliance with the Law of the Sea This section highlights some of the challenges and issues concerning the agreements from the perspective of international law and specifically LOS. To clarify, this article does not address the rules for maritime boundary delimitation or examine the agreement’s compliance with these rules. This is not a scientific analysis of the maritime environment of the Mediterranean Sea. Rather, the article highlights several legal issues that may arise in this context. 2.1 Israel’s EEZ The main issue or challenge that may arise with respect to the agreement is the question of Israel’s so-called EEZ. Unlike the territorial sea or the continental shelf, there is a need to explicitly proclaim an EEZ,27 yet Israel never officially proclaimed its EEZ. It is noteworthy that the 2010 agreement between Israel and Cyprus does not constitute a proclamation, since boundary delimitation agreements cannot establish a maritime zone; they can only divide zones that already exist. The coastal state must unilaterally proclaim its EEZ before agreeing to delimit the zone with its neighbors. A government decision in 2011 determined the coordinates for the northern limit of the territorial sea and EEZ. That decision was deposited in the UN,28 but the 2011 decision does not constitute a proclamation of Israel’s EEZ for several reasons. First, the decision deviates from state practice since there is no reference to the breadth of the zone, the applicable law in the zone, and the coastal state and other states’ rights and obligations in the zone.29 The decision also refers only to one line and not to the whole zone, which spatially extends seawards. There is no legal significance in “proclaiming” one line out of the four (including the coastline) that comprise the maritime zone. Lastly, the language of the decision indicates that the intention was to delimit the boundary as a reaction to Lebanon’s proclamation of its EEZ rather than a proclamation of Israel’s EEZ.30 Technically, Israel does not have an EEZ. This renders the agreement with Lebanon unnecessary or void. 15. Compare the Israel deposit of charts to the UN 2011, supra note 12, with the deposit chart of the agreement, DOALOS website, available at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/ LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/IsraelCoordinates. pdf 16. See Annex A to the agreement, materials submitted for the Israeli government decision concerning the agreement, supra note 5, p. 7. 17. UNCLOS, supra note 2, Art. 56(1)(a). 18. See DOALOS website (unofficial translation), Feb. 10, 1953, available at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/ LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ISR_1953_ Law.pdf 19. The continental shelf is the seabed beyond the territorial sea and up to at least 200 nm. See UNCLOS, supra note 2, Art. 76(1). Israeli law mentions only the seabed and subsoil, see unofficial translation, DOALOS, supra note 18. There was an attempt to legislate a law that regulates all Israel’s maritime zones; however, the legislation process has stopped due to changes in the Knesset and government. See the Knesset website, available at https://main.knesset. gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Laws/Pages/LawBill.aspx? t=lawsuggestionssearch&lawitemid=2022714 20. See also the explanations to the Maritime Zones Bill (57782017) (Hebrew), Knesset website, available at https:// fs.knesset.gov.il/20/law/20_ls1_392707.pdf, p. 48. 21. Advisory opinion of Israeli Ministry of Justice, materials submitted for the Israeli government decision concerning the agreement, supra note 5, p. 37. 22. UNCLOS, supra note 2, Art. 2(1); see also John Noyes, “The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,” THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 91, 97 (Donald Rothwell, Alex Oude Elferink, Karen Scott and Tim Stephens, eds., Oxford University Press, 2015). 23. Advisory opinion of Israeli Ministry of Justice, materials submitted for the Israeli government decision concerning the agreement, supra note 5, p. 48. 24. For example, the claim that Israel does not exercise its jurisdiction and power in the disputed area does not mean that it has no jurisdiction and power in the area. Id., pp. 51-53. 25. Noyes, supra note 22, p. 96. 26. VCLT, supra note 6, Art. 27.
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