23 Spring 2023 The Chinese regime is also accused of additional acts of cultural genocide outside the camps. These include: 1) laws and policies instituted to limit and criminalize the practice of both Islam and Uyghur culture and language,33 and making any violation of the prohibitions on the exercise of religious freedom a basis for arrest or detention;34 2) aggressive promotion of marriage between Han Chinese and Uyghurs, in particular between Han men and Uyghur women;35 and 3) destruction of Uyghur religious and cultural property. While the restrictions on the Uyghur community with regard to their right to express their religion and culture in daily life and outside detention centers are clear violations of human rights law instruments that determine the right to freedom of religion and the right to perform cultural practices,36 they are not in and of themselves a form of cultural genocide intended to systematically destroy the Uyghurs by means of eliminating their culture and religion. However, considering the establishment of internment camps (in which at least one million people have been incarcerated so far)37 that provide evidence for the special intent to replace the Uyghurs’ culture with that of the dominant Han group, these camps constitute a form of cultural genocide. As noted above, China has strongly objected to the accusations. It has also limited the international community's access to Xinjiang and its ability to intervene.38 Yet, when supported by the endorsement of the theoretical concept of cultural genocide, the evidence collected by NGOs and reports of the UN monitoring bodies that proved China's violations of international law could eventually bring about a strong international condemnation and significant actions against China.39 3. Political Genocide Another form of genocide included in Lemkin's description of the “eight techniques of genocide” is political genocide. In contrast to cultural genocide, political genocide is a physical form of genocide, and thus should have more naturally fit within the criteria of the crime of genocide as defined in the Genocide Convention. However, the convention limited the protected groups to national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups. The rationale for this limitation was identified by the ICTR as focusing on “stable groups,” that is, groups whose belonging is determined by birth.40 Political groups have thus not gained the protection of the convention since they are not defined as “stable” groups. Nevertheless, the exclusion of political genocide from the purview of the definition of genocide in international law has not gained support across the board. For example, 33. “Like We Were Enemies in War, China’s Mass Internment, Torture and Persecution of Muslims in Xinjiang,” AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 25 (2021), (Amnesty Report); USHMM Report, at 18. 34. USHMM Report, at 19. 35. USHMM Report, at 10-11. Given that a person who refuses such marriages risks being detained, the “aggressive promotion” may be rightfully described as forcing the marriage. 36. These rights are enumerated in the customary law; UN GA, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Dec. 10, 1948, 217 A (III); UN GA, Elimination of all forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief, Dec. 16, 1976, A/RES/31/138, and in treaties to which China is a party such as the UN GA, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, U.N.T.S. vol. 660, p. 195. 37. The Chinese government does not supply any official data on these centers so exact numbers are not available. These estimates are based on NGO reports. See Amnesty report, at 23; Bamakhrama, supra note 27, at 404. 38. See for example, the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights report on September 15, 2021, on her failure to gain access to Xinjiang. Sophie Richardson, “UN Rights Chief to Report on China’s Abuses in Xinjiang,” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/15/ un-rights-chief-report-chinas-abuses-xinjiang 39. For the implications of the international community's recognition of the cultural genocide of the Uyghurs on the development of cultural genocide as a soft law norm of international law, see Moodrick-Even Khen, supra note 24, at 106-109. 40. Judgment, Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), Trial Chamber, Sept. 2, 1998, ¶ 511. 41. Hybrid courts are ad hoc courts with mixed characteristics of domestic and international courts, established to try perpetrators of core crimes including war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The “hybrid characteristics are found in their applicable law, and in the rules of their composition, procedure and jurisdiction.” For more on hybrid courts, see Hybrid Courts, in Ariel University Center for the Research and Study of Genocide: https://www. ariel.ac.il/wp/rsg/hybrid-courts/ the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia ‒ established as a hybrid court41 in June 2006 to try perpetrators of mass atrocities committed in Cambodia between April 1975 and January 1979 by members of the Communist Pol Pot regime ‒ included the crime of genocide in its jurisdiction.
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