JUSTICE - No. 66

6 No. 66 JUSTICE energetically negotiated and implemented. Regarding the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco, these arrangements include the establishment of full diplomatic relations. In the case of the UAE and Bahrain, these relations include the establishment of embassies and exchange of resident ambassadors. In the case of Morocco, the commitment is to “resume official contacts,” including the reopening of liaison offices in Rabat and Tel Aviv. The Abraham Accords also identify a series of fields in which normal relations and cooperation are envisioned, to be realized in forthcoming agreements. In the case of the UAE and Bahrain, the list is extensive, including finance and investment, civil aviation, innovation, healthcare technology, energy, agriculture, water and more. In the UAE Agreement , an annex sets out key principles governing relations in each of these areas. The Sudan Agreement includes a less extensive list of fields in which arrangements will be agreed upon (economy and trade, as well as agriculture, technology, aviation, migration issues and other areas). While the Morocco Agreement does not commit to reaching specific agreements, cooperation on a broad range of issues, as with the UAE and Bahrain, is envisaged. What Is Not Included in the Abraham Accords A comparison with Israel's peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan highlights not only the warm tone of the recent agreements, but also the absence of provisions that were necessary when agreements were reached with neighbors who shared borders and a history of conflict. The Abraham Accord agreements do not, for example, contain provisions regarding recognition and demarcation of international boundaries (Egypt Treaty Article 2; Jordanian Treaty Article 3). Beyond general commitments to work together to ensure peace and stability and to prevent terrorist and hostile activities, they do not contain detailed security provisions (Egypt Article 4; Jordan Article 4). There is also no reference to water allocation (Jordan Article 6), or maritime passage (Egypt Article 5). Almost entirely absent from the recent agreements is any reference to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The preamble to the UAE Agreement , alongside a reference to Israel's treaties with Egypt and Jordan, does mention the commitment of the parties to“working together to realize a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that meets the legitimate needs and aspiration of both peoples,” while the Morocco Agreement makes reference to the “coherent, constant and unchanged position of the Kingdom of Morocco on the Palestinian question”and“the importance of preserving the special status of the sacred city of Jerusalem.” These preambular references are clearly tangential to the thrust of the agreements and their focus on establishing normal bilateral relations. This is very different from the approach reflected in the Arab League Plan adopted in Beirut in March 2002. While that initiative held out the prospect of normal relations between Arab countries and Israel, it explicitly conditioned such relations on a series of measures to be taken by Israel, including full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Golan Heights; resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue in accordance with UNGA Resolution 194; and acceptance of the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. Accordingly, the recent agreements, which see normal relations not as a grudging concession to Israel but rather as a key to mutual benefit and prosperity, present a significant challenge to the Palestinian leadership and its strategy of reliance on broad Arab opposition to normalization with Israel. Following the agreements with the UAE and Bahrain, the Palestinian leadership failed in its efforts to have the Arab League condemn the Abraham Accords, and it is striking that its opposition was far more muted in relation to the subsequent agreements with Sudan and Morocco. At the same time, it is not yet clear what impact these bilateral agreements will have on their signatories' conduct in the multilateral context. Both the UAE Agreement and the Bahrain Agreement include provisions providing for the application by the parties “in their bilateral relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions of which they are both parties.” In the case of the UAE Agreement , this commitment includes “submission of appropriate notification to the depositaries of such conventions.” It is not clear whether any such notification has so far been given. No agreement is reached in a vacuum and these agreements as well were reached in a unique set of circumstances and parallel arrangements. These contextual dimensions are for the most part not referred to directly in the agreements. The common threat of Iranian nuclearization, for example, clearly a critical shared interest, does not find expression beyond a general reference to strategic cooperation. Israeli commitments in relation to initiatives toward applying sovereignty to parts of the West Bank are also not referenced in the agreements, though Israel's