5 Spring-Summer 2017 of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent armed conflict.” Namely, not all the territories,6 whereas Resolution 2334 “Underlines that it [i.e. the Council] will not recognize any changes to the 4 June 1967 lines, including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties through negotiations.”7 Does this mean that Resolution 2334 intends to override Resolution 242 and its successor 338(1973)? Most probably, this is not the intention of the drafters. First, in its preamble Resolution 2334 reaffirms its previous resolutions, including 242. Second, and perhaps more important, it recalls several documents which encourage negotiations on the basis of Resolution 242, e.g. the “Madrid terms of reference”8 and the Quartet Roadmap.9 Moreover, both resolutions favor “secure and recognized” boundaries, i.e. agreed ones. Last but not least, the provisions of 242 (and 338) had been accepted by Israel and her neighbors, thus having gained the status of an agreement. One can imagine several explanations for the difference between the two resolutions. First, maybe the drafters of 2334 have adopted the Arab interpretation of 242, namely, as if the resolution had called for full withdrawal from all the territories.10 Amore reasonable explanation would recognize that the two texts actually differ only slightly. According to 242, there should be intensive negotiations on the borders, without any starting point. According to 2334, the starting point is the 1967 line, but this can and will be changed by common agreement. The June 4, 1967 line calls for some background information. In the West Bank, this line is based on the armistice demarcation line of 1949 established by the Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agreement.11 It was not intended to be a political border. The armistice was intended to be a step towards peace, as ordered by the Security Council,12 but the Arab states refused to continue on the road to peace. Thus, the armistice line continued to exist, until the armistice broke down in 1967. Much later, in 1994, the relations between Israel and Jordan were settled by the peace treaty. Thus, the legal foundations of the 1967 line have long ago disappeared. Nevertheless, the international community treats it as the boundary between Israel and “the Palestinian Occupied Territories,” as evident by the International Court of Justice13 and Resolution 2334. The armistice demarcation line was based on the cease-fire line of 1948, a military fact. But political boundaries have to take into account considerations of geography, demography and economics. The authors of Resolution 2334 did not limit themselves to describing the situation and recommending future developments. The Council also reaffirmed its “determination to examine practical ways and means to secure the full implementation of its relevant resolutions” (para. 11). The Council thus did not restrain itself to the mere implementation of Resolution 2334, but required also the implementation of its other relevant resolutions. The resolution mentioned the intensification of international and regional diplomatic efforts (para. 9) and asked to be informed every three months by the SecretaryGeneral about the progress on the implementation (para. 12). There is perhaps a hint about possible means of implementation in the provision that all states should “distinguish, in their relevant dealings, between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967” (para. 5). It is not stated what kind of dealings are envisaged, but one can assume that they are probably mainly economic. Since Resolution 2334 relies particularly on the Quartet Roadmap (2003) and on the Arab Peace Initiative (2002 and 2007), a short summary of these two documents follows. The Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent TwoState Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict envisions the creation of a Palestinian state as a solution to the 6. Ibid. para. 3. 7. According to some Arab commentators, the provision actually means full withdrawal. The issue has been discussed in Ruth Lapidoth, The Misleading Interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), in ISRAEL’S RIGHTS AS A NATION-STATE IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY (Alan Baker ed., 2011), 85-95. 8. Text of the United States-Soviet Union Invitation to the Madrid Peace Conference, 1991, published, inter alia, in, THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS (R. Lapidoth and M. Hirsch eds.,1992), 384-385. 9. A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, U.S. Department of State (2003), available at https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/ pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm (last visited April 24, 2017). 10. E.g., John McHugo, Resolution 242: A Reappraisal of the Right-Wing Israeli Interpretation of the Withdrawal Phrase with Reference to the Conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, 51 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 851-882 (2002), reprinted in THE PALESTINE QUESTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Victor Kattan, ed., 2008), 357-387. 11. Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agreement, 1949, art. V, VI and Annex I. 12. S.C. Res. 62 (1948). 13. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004.
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